Unless Washington changes course, we may be nearing a turning point in our ability to play a leading role in East Asia. Several factors—including distraction due to Iraq, constrained resources, and poor alliance management—are eroding our position in the western Pacific. If our allies lose confidence in U.S. policy, that will make it much harder for us to address regional challenges and handle the rise of China. But that’s exactly what is happening.

Politically, the Bush administration’s adherence to the flawed Six Party Talks on North Korea is causing strains with some of our key Pacific partners. Throughout the process, even as American negotiators have made concessions to Pyongyang at each stage, we have brushed aside the concerns of our closest allies. Japan, for example, has refused to provide any economic aid until North Korea fully and honestly accounts for those Japanese citizens it kidnapped during the 1970s and 1980s. Japan has urged the U.S. State Department not to conclude any deals with Pyongyang until the kidnapping issue is resolved.

Washington assured Tokyo that it would not be “left in the lurch,” yet Foggy Bottom also decided that it would not formally link resolution of the kidnapping issue to an agreement on North Korea’s nuclear programs. Much worse, from Tokyo’s point of view, is that the United States may soon remove Pyongyang from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. If America takes North Korea off the terror list without resolving the kidnapping issue, many Japanese will view it as a betrayal.

Nor is South Korea satisfied with current U.S. policy. Its new president, Lee Myung-bak, who just visited Washington, says it is unacceptable for America to make bilateral agreements with North Korea while ignoring Seoul. But if America weakens its stance on North Korea’s nukes, Lee will find it harder to maintain his policy of refusing economic aid to Pyongyang until dictator Kim Jong Il lives up to his promises.

Taking a softer line on North Korea might make sense, so long as we were achieving our goal of “complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement” of its nuclear programs. But few experts still believe that Kim Jong Il will voluntarily give up his weapons. To other countries in region, striking Pyongyang from the U.S. terror list without achieving a full disclosure of its weapons programs and proliferation activities makes the United States look unreliable and desperate.

As China increases its military budget by double digits each year, our allies are questioning whether they can trust U.S. security commitments.

But the Six Party Talks are only part of the story of America’s weakening position in the region. General security issues are also causing increasing tension in our alliances. For example, South Korean officials have stated repeatedly that they hope to delay the dissolution of Combined Forces Command (CFC), which puts U.S. and South Korean troops under American control in wartime. So far, Pentagon officials and the White House have refused to reconsider the timetable, under which CFC is set to dissolve in 2012. South Korean military officers believe they will not be ready to take over wartime control by then. U.S. obstinacy on this issue may well damage our close military relations with Seoul.

Indeed, as China increases its military budget by double digits each year, our allies are naturally questioning whether they can trust our security commitments. By shifting U.S. forces out of South Korea and Okinawa, America raises questions about potentially larger U.S. drawdowns in Northeast Asia. Meanwhile, both Australia and Japan have asked to buy our F-22 Raptor fighter jets—and yet Washington refuses to consider exporting or licensing modified production of F-22s, and federal funding for F-22 production will end after 2009.

Of lesser, but not insignificant, concern to our allies is Washington’s repeated failure to respond to Chinese provocations, including stalking American ships, refusing port to U.S. Navy vessels, attempting to hack our computers, and shooting down a weather satellite. America seems willing to let China change the rules of international behavior in the Pacific, and that will leave all nations in the region feeling less secure. It will also make them more wary of antagonizing China.

Our allies are equally worried about our economic policies, especially as global growth slows. While China signs bilateral and multilateral economic agreements, the Democratic-controlled Congress is scuttling free trade pacts. Most seriously, the likely congressional failure to ratify the Korea-U.S. (KORUS) Free Trade Agreement will be a blow to the U.S.-Korean alliance. Korean officials believe that killing the KORUS FTA will not only harm President Lee's economic revitalization plans but will send a broader signal about the lack of U.S. commitment to the alliance. It is difficult to explain to South Korean officials that the trade pact is being held hostage to domestic political concerns; our allies see it as an example of American untrustworthiness. Similarly, Japan and other friendly countries, such as Singapore, openly lament our absence from the East Asian Summit, as well as the lack of high-level attention to meetings of the Association of South East Asian Nations.

Inside the Beltway, policymakers firmly believe that the United States is deeply engaged in East Asia and remains a trustworthy partner. But in global power politics, perception counts as much as reality. The United States is increasingly seen as disengaged, as willing (or even eager) to appease governments that oppose its policies, and as lacking a strategic vision for the region.

No one is suggesting that America will purposely abrogate its Asian alliances anytime soon. However, if we continue to take our partners for granted, we may one day find ourselves adrift in the Pacific.

Michael Auslin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

Image by Shutterstock/Darren Wamboldt.